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Abstract The article thematizes the actuality of despotism through a double reading of 
Xenophon’s Hiero and Dave Eggers’s The Circle. A key text on despotism, Hiero is interesting 
to reconsider in a contemporary context because of its explicit focus on the economic element 
in the nexus of despotism, economy and voluntary servitude. Discussion this, the article turns 
to The Circle, a dystopic novel from 2013, which elaborates on how the attempt at creating a 
transparent society results in the perversion of democracy to the point where a despotism fuelled 
by economization and voluntary servitude becomes immediately evident. Notwithstanding the 
significant differences between the two understandings of despotism that proliferate in Hiero 
and The Circle, their shared focus on the nexus of despotism, economy and voluntary servitude 
testifies to an interesting case of convergence in divergence. Offering an account of this 
continuity, the article reflects upon the nexus of despotism, economy and voluntary servitude 
itself, arguing, to end with, that it should be re-thought in a new way today. The concept of use 
is suggested as a key concept in this context. 
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Despite its past centrality as a significant concept of political thought, today “despotism” seems 
to have become a redundant concept that designates an exceptional, archaic form of 
government. Paradoxically, however, nothing is easier today, in an increasingly economized 
and securitized world, to come across the despotic imperative which blurs the distinction 
between law and unlaw. Thus, populations seem to have grown a habitual obedience to the 
dictates of the market and the state authorities. Ours is a world that can live with “strong” 
leaders some of whom aspire to ruling a country as if it were a corporation, some to life-time 
dictatorship, some to both. While they act like one, though, none of them perceive themselves 
as despots. 
But how did we come to this point? And what is wrong with the despotic imperative? Insofar 
as history is a theater, in which virtual ideas return to the actual, reiterating, repeating the ghosts 
of the past, in order to produce difference, “despotism” must be treated as an idea, which cannot 
be reduced to its actual, historical forms. Despotism is a generic idea, which expresses itself 
differently in different times and spaces; a virtual, metaphysical problem that cannot fully 
actualize itself in concrete situations. Therefore, it is necessary to see its contemporary 
permutations, its endless resurrections, even when it appears as its opposite. In this sense, the 
actuality of despotism is grounded in the problem of repetition. Hence in this article I juxtapose 
the ancient and the modern accounts of despotism, Xenophon’s Hiero and Dave Eggers’s The 
Circle, and reveal the (dis)continuities between them.  
Originally, a despot is defined as a person who lives and rules without regard for the society. 
“So that,” as Machiavelli puts it in the Discourses, “he alone, and not his country, profits from 
his acquisitions”. Machiavelli adds: “And whoever should want to confirm this opinion with 
infinite other arguments, let him read Xenophon’s treatise which he wrote on Tyranny” (1999: 
II. 2). This advice of Machiavelli is of course a good reason to start a discussion of despotism 
with Xenophon’s treatise Hiero. Xenophon offers here an intriguing critique of despotism 
through a fictional Socratic dialogue between a despot, Hiero, and a poet-philosopher, 
Simonides, illuminating both the despotic logic and endeavoring to articulating remedies for 
it. My main reason to turn to Hiero, though, is Xenophon’s explicit focus on economy in his 
treatment of the nexus of despotism, economy and voluntary servitude, and thus his implicit 
transgression of the Greek separation between politics and economy more visibly than, for 
instance, Plato and Aristotle. As such, Xenophon’s Hiero is a key text on despotism, many 
aspects of which are interesting to rethink in a contemporary context. In this article I want to 
do this in a specific way, by re-vitalizing the nexus of despotism, economy and voluntary 
servitude, and asking whether thinking in terms of this nexus is still useful today. 
The phenomenon of despotism has mutated extensively since Xenophon’s time. To thematize 
this, I turn to a contemporary fiction, The Circle, Dave Eggers’s dystopic novel from 2013, 
which elaborates on the despotic tendency inherent to the contemporary society. Set in 
California in the near future, the novel’s protagonist, Mae, works at the Circle, “the most 
influential company in the world” (Eggers 2013: 1). Having already bought up companies such 
as Google, Facebook and Twitter, the Circle is a highly innovative and popular web company. 
One of its achievements is to combine all individual interactions into a single online identity 
called TruYou. As the use of TruYou spreads, the company starts to accumulate more and 
more information about online social interactions, personal communications and business data. 
But the Circle, being a “democratic” (401) company, decides that “all knowledge must be 
democratically accessible” (302). However, the attempt at creating an absolutely transparent 
society results in the perversion of democracy to the point where a despotism fuelled by 
economization and voluntary servitude becomes immediately evident. As such, the society 
depicted in The Circle, a society in which metric power, algorithmic governmentality and 
virtual money constitute the new game in town, is reminiscent of what Deleuze (1995) has 
diagnosed as control society. Today, Deleuze was arguing, factories tend to be replaced with 
businesses, politics by continuous opinion polling, and critique by continuous digital 
assessment. Turning marketing into a dispositif to remodel the whole society, control society 
realizes a “real subsumption” of labour under capital, corresponding to a total commodity 
fetishism (Hardt 1998: 35). Importantly, however, in control societies “older means of control, 
borrowed from the old sovereign societies” also come back (Deleuze 1995: 182). The high-
tech servitude, which The Circle skilfully describes by pushing the economic element to the 
foreground, is especially interesting in this regard. 
Notwithstanding the significant differences between the two understandings of despotism that 
proliferate in Hiero and The Circle, then, their shared focus on the nexus of despotism, 
economy and voluntary servitude testifies to an interesting case of convergence in divergence. 
Offering an account of this continuity in both works, I also aim at reflecting upon the nexus of 
despotism, economy and voluntary servitude itself, arguing, to end with, that it should be re-
thought in a new way today.  
 
Hiero 
Hiero is initiated by a question on happiness, on which the Athenian political philosophy 
sought to found itself. Apparently assuming the desirability of being a despot, Simonides asks 
Hiero whether the despot is happier than the multitude which he rules (Xenophon 2013: 1.2). 
“It is not so, Simonides,” Hiero answers: 
To fear a crowd, and yet fear solitude, to fear to go unguarded, and yet fear the very men 
who guard you, to recoil from attendants unarmed and yet dislike to see them armed – 
surely that is a cruel predicament! (6.4) 
Most things considered worthy in daily life have a dubious quality for the despot. The praise 
he receives, for instance, always comes in the form of flattery and it does so from subjects who 
are not free (1.15). Even more importantly, since almost everything is easily available to him, 
Hiero complains about “a feeling of repletion” (1.19). At one point Simonides wonders 
whether this feeling of Hiero, repletion, applies to erotic pleasures as well. According to Hiero, 
the despot is worse off on that front, too, for he “can never feel sure that he is loved”, that his 
lover’s acts of compliance are prompted by affection rather than fear (1.37). To illustrate his 
point, Hiero describes his relation to Dailochus, one of his lovers: 
… what I long to get, I very strongly desire to get by his goodwill, and with his consent; 
but I think I could sooner desire to do myself an injury than to take it from him by force 
(1.34). For to take from an enemy against his will is, I think, the greatest of all pleasures, 
but favours from a loved one are very pleasant, I fancy, only when he consents. (1.35) 
Hiero complains further that he cannot expect affective reciprocity from his fellow citizens, 
either, for the simple reason that he is never at peace with them. Besides, since he can sustain 
his relations with his lovers and his subjects only through force, Hiero can never trust them 
(2.11). Which excludes him from friendship or love which is a “blessing” for ordinary people 
(3.5). Against this background, Hiero concludes that the despot is necessarily less happy than 
his subjects. But then why Hiero, or other despots, never attempt to get rid of their power 
voluntarily, if despotism is as dreadful as Hiero’s verdict suggests? Hiero replies: 
this is the crowning misery of despotic power, that it cannot even be got rid of. For how 
could any despot ever find means to repay in full all whom he has robbed, or himself 
serve all the terms of imprisonment that he has inflicted? Or how could he forfeit a life 
for every man whom he has put to death? (7.12). 
The rest of Hiero is dominated by Simonides’ monologue-like advice to Hiero with a view to 
reforming despotism. In this, characteristically of Xenophon, Simonides does not indulge in a 
moral condemnation of Hiero or his despotic rule. Instead, he suggests to him that only through 
defending the common good he can secure himself. Only in this way he can secure what he 
really wants, the affection of his subjects and their willing obedience (11.8, 11.12). 
Simonides’s advice culminates with the following crucial theme: 
Account the fatherland your estate, the citizens your comrades, friends your own 
children, your sons possessions dear as life. And try to surpass all these in deeds of 
kindness. For if you out-do your friends in kindness, it is certain that your enemies will 
not be able to resist you. And if you do all these things, rest assured that you will be 
possessed of the fairest and most blessed possession in the world; for none will be jealous 
of your happiness. (11.14) 
During Simonides’s advice Hiero remains silent. We are thus not sure whether he is convinced. 
The question is whether we are, for the dialogue between wisdom and power, between the poet 
and the despot, invites several questions. First of all, can we trust Hiero? And how about 
Simonides – is his attempt at reforming despotism, at reconciling the despot and the society, 
realistic and viable? Most importantly, what are the implications of “accounting the fatherland 
your estate”, of ruling the polis, the society, as if it were an oikos, a household? 
Hiero’s rhetoric ceases to be convincing on several accounts. As Leo Strauss (1963: 45-8) 
observed, he blames despotism mostly on the grounds that the despot is disadvantaged 
compared to the private citizen, especially in relation to homosexual love, failing to mention 
other pleasures related to power. Such omissions cast doubt on Hiero’s judgment that 
despotism is bad even for the despot. Further, Hiero is an interested party in the conversation 
and it is in his interest to conceal what he is and to pretend being one he is not, that is, to 
dissimulate and to simulate, which are two defining characteristics of the despot (see Canetti 
1962: 370). Thus we can suggest that in the dialogue Hiero approaches Simonides, and us, in 
the guise of a discussant, but possibly with a concealed agenda. Such concealment requires, as 
Canetti observed, a mask (Canetti 1962: 377). Hiero therefore avoids discussing the most 
central theme regarding despotism, its “self-aggrandizing nature”, diverting our attention to 
greater or smaller pleasure quotients of private or public individuals (Higgins 1977: 63). 
Ironically, however, by staging a strong indictment of despotism in this way, by letting Hiero 
condemn himself, Xenophon also intimates the limited validity of that indictment” (Strauss 
1963: 48). 
Another deception pertains to Hiero’s statements about his longing for the consent and 
friendship of his subjects. His longing might be genuine but this does not mean that consent 
and friendship are more appealing to Hiero than what he describes as “the greatest of all 
pleasures,” that is, “to take from an enemy against his will,” or capturing (see Newell 1988: 
118 and Rasmussen 2009: 42). Power is basically an apparatus of capture; it “only reigns over 
what it is capable of internalizing” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 360). To use a metaphor from 
Kafka, it is like “a cage” that goes “in search of a bird” (Kafka 2015: 16). Thus, even the 
earliest written creation myth, the Enuma Elish, contains scenes of capturing. The fourth tablet, 
for instance, describes a king/God, Marduk, fighting with a “net” in order to take his enemies 
“captive.”1 The desire for capturing, “to keep free men slaves” (Xenophon 2013: 1.34), is what 
Hiero cannot let go. 
 
                                                          
1 (Enuma Elish, Tablet IV: 41-44; http://www.crystalinks.com/enumaelish.html) 
Perversion and Economy 
The ancient Athenian thought related the concept of despotism to perversion, distortion and 
corruption. Plato, for instance, defines despotism as a perverted form of democracy. When, 
with a populist gesture, democracy sweeps the principles of good government away, it passes 
into tyranny (Plato 2003: VIII 562a). The people see the monster they have created at one 
point, but this is always a sign that it is too late (VIII 569b). For Aristotle, too, despotism is a 
perversion, the perversion of kingship (Aristotle 1995: III 1279b4). It is a form of rule 
exercised over “unwilling subjects” (IV: 1295a). Thus it can only be sustained through blatant 
terror or reform, through “making it more like kingship” so that the reformed despot can “act, 
or at any rate, appear to act, in the role of a good player of the part of king” (Aristotle 1995: V 
1314a29). Playing the king, the despot must become a vanishing mediator on the way to 
kingship as “true” government. 
Xenophon, too, understands despotism as distinct from kingship. In contrast to Plato and 
Aristotle, however, he does not immediately condemn it as a perverted, illegitimate regime. 
He recognizes its unhealthy aspects, but assumes “the possibility of improving tyranny outside 
traditional notions of moral and political virtue” (Rasmussen 2009: 34). Thus Simonides seeks 
to reform tyranny as tyranny, without transforming it into another, better political regime. His 
focus is on Hiero’s own concerns rather than forcing him, as Aristotle does, to play the king. 
As such, however, Simonides’ reformed despotism does not call for a rule over unwilling 
subjects. Rather, it emphasizes the significance of willing subjects. What is missing in it is not 
consent but the rule of law (Strauss 1963: 68). In Simonides’s benevolent despotism, the 
subjects can be better off, even happier, but not free or equal. The focus, at any rate, is on 
economy. Reformed Hiero is an economist. 
Aristotle makes an effort in Politics to differentiate between economy and the chērematistikē, 
between the “natural” form of acquisition, which consists in attaining “true wealth”, property 
or goods that are necessary for the life of the household or the state, on the one hand, and the 
“unnatural” form of acquisition, which consists in selfish profit gain, on the other (Aristotle 
1995: 23, 326). As Marx articulates it, the logic in the first case operates in the form of C-M-
C: Commodity is sold for Money in order to buy another Commodity (1976: 252). In the 
second, “unnatural” case, however, one is solely concerned with money. Now money becomes 
both the beginning and the end of the process of exchange: M-C-M. “The movement of capital 
is therefore limitless” (252). The problem is that, despite the differentiation, there is an overlap 
between the two forms, between “economy” and the “chrematistic” principle. As Aristotle 
admits, the two modes are “not identical yet … not far removed” (Aristotle 1995: 24). It is as 
if what is “unnatural”, the accumulation of money-capital ad infinitum, is always already at 
the heart of “natural” economy, and has a potential to become its ultimate aim. As such, 
Aristotle’s discussion serves as locus classicus both for a generic concept of capital and for its 
moral-ethical critique (Albertsen 2012: 12). 
The problem is equally unsettled in Xenophon. In the beginning of Oeconomicus, the question 
is whether economy is an art that serves the common good. In the end, though, we are left with 
an economy reduced to pure chrematistics unlimited by any wisdom. Hence the economist, 
Ischomachos, who buys “inactive land” only to improve it with a view selling for profit 
(Xenophon 1998: XX. 26). An emerging question is therefore: can this metamorphosis of 
“economy” into “chrematistics” be kept under check by an adherence to moral philosophy? 
When Marx praises Xenophon’s treatment of division of labor for being more detailed than 
Plato’s, he also mentions in passing Xenophon’s “characteristic bourgeois instinct” (Marx 
1976: 488) which tends to transform economy into chrematistics. To be sure, one might suggest 
that the Socratic Xenophon’s instincts “were controlled by his admiration for Socrates” 
(Strauss 1998: 203). But there is is no guarantee that this virtue is transferable to economics, 
that economists such as Ischomachos can follow Socrates in prioritizing philosophy over 
economy. 
We have so far two perversions, of economy into chrematistics and of kingship into despotism. 
But what if despotism is not really an extreme perversion but rather the truth of kingship? And 
what if chrematistics is not merely an “unnatural” deviation from an economy based on 
“natural” use-value production but the truth of economy as such? To entertain these ideas, let 
us now turn to the relationship between the despot and the slave. 
 
The despot and the slave 
In its origin, in ancient Athens, the rule of the despot, oeconomicus, designated a specific power 
relation that takes place in the oikos, in the domestic sphere, where the despot governs his 
children, his wife, and his slaves. “Political” power, in contrast, was seen as something that 
pertains to the polis, as a relationship between free men concerning the common good. 
Especially the presence of the slave in the oikos means, on this account, that oeconomicus 
cannot be political. But who is the slave, and what is his function in relation to the distinction 
between the polis and the oikos? As is well known, the ancient Greeks defined the human as 
an actual form, as “political animal,” excluding from the polis those not considered worthy of 
human-political life. The slave is someone who is banned from politics. Aristotle justifies the 
logic of this abandonment with reference to an interesting concept, the “use of the body” 
(Agamben 2015: 5; see also Aristotle 1995: 1254b.17–20). Just as the soul makes use of the 
body as an instrument, the master uses the (body of the) slave as an instrument, as an extension 
of his own body. In this way the idea of slavery brings with it a constitutive division within the 
human between a body reduced to others’ instrumental use and another, properly “human” one 
(Agamben 2015: 9). As such, the slave is not so much defined by ownership or property 
relations but by the lack of autonomy: the slave is one that exists for another, and for another’s 
instrumental use (11). 
Following this logic, the despot can be defined as the one who reduces a multitude of others to 
the position of an instrument, who captures others’ power of acting (potentia) and turns it into 
a “power over” (potestas) by mobilizing them in line with his own desire (Lordon 2014: 3-4). 
But how is the use of potential (power of acting) is captured? To understand this, we must 
dwell on what “use” meant to the ancient Athenians in more detail. 
In contrast to the modern understanding of the term as utilization of an object by a subject, the 
term in Greek points toward an intermediary zone in which the subject is affected by the action. 
In order to use something, one must be affected by it, constitute oneself as one making use of 
it. Thus, in use, human being and the world are in a relationship of “reciprocal immanence” 
(Agamben 2015: 30). The Aristotelian definition of use, however, introduces a differentiation. 
It divides “use” into dynamis and energeia, potential and act, while the pivotal focus of the 
distinction shifts onto the passage from potential to act, a passage secured by habit (50). But 
does potential always automatically pass into act? One can of course have the habit in an 
inoperative state, without it producing any effects. But since for Aristotle the ergon (the proper 
function) of a human being is to act, the habit (of a potential) cannot be inoperative (Agamben 
2013: 96). 
The problem here is that “use” really precedes the division of potential and act. Being-in-use 
is distinct from, irreducible to being-in-act, and it does not take for granted a potential that 
automatically passes into the act or is put into work (Agamben 2015: 58). A piano player, for 
instance, is not merely the master of the potential to play the piano but constitutes herself as 
making use of herself as well as the piano insofar as she plays and knows habitually how to 
play. “Use, as habit, is a form-of-life and not the knowledge or faculty of a subject” (62). Use 
in this sense is not a virtue of a hexis (in Greek) or habitus (in Latin) that converts potential 
into praxis but something ontologically given, an inoperative praxis that can only emerge 
through a de-activation of the potential-act apparatus which posits the primacy of act over 
potential (81). It is a principle that precludes the disappearance of potential into the act (93). 
To express this principle, Agamben turns to Spinoza: 
Contemplation is the paradigm of use. Like use, contemplation does not have a subject, 
because in it the contemplator is completely lost and dissolved; like use, contemplation 
does not have an object, because in the work it contemplates only its (own) potential. 
Life, which contemplates in the work its (own) potential of acting or making, is rendered 
inoperative in all its works and lives only in use-of-itself, lives only (its) livability. (63) 
Herein we also approach the main conflict between philosophy and economy. Is economy an 
art, which Socrates, the poor philosopher of Athens, can possess? Since management is related 
to knowledge, and since Socrates is a knowledgeable philosopher, he would be the “best 
economist” (Strauss 1998: 113). However, insofar as economy is identified as the increase of 
wealth, the richest person, not Socrates, would be the best economist. Thus, in Oeconomicus, 
Xenophon’s Socrates describes himself as a chatterer, an “idle talker” who “measures the air” 
(Xenophon 1998: XI. 3). He habitually lives in use-of-himself as philosopher. 
Slavery, in this context, expresses the capture of “use” by power, the transformation of the 
human into an “instrument-human” (Agamben 2015: 78). At the same time, however, the slave 
is an “animal-human;” while the instrument-human allows for the capture of living bodies into 
economic apparatuses, the animal-human allows for the opening up of a political space. “The 
strategy is always the same: something is divided, excluded, and pushed to the bottom, and 
precisely through this exclusion, it is included as archè and foundation” (263). The 
simultaneous exclusion and inclusion of the bare life of the slave is the foundation of politics. 
Which is also to say that “bare life” does not pre-exist the polis but rather is produced, assumes 
its form, through the very distinction between natural life and political life, between zoē and 
bios (263). 
Consequently, one can say that there are not two “arts” than can be neatly distinguished from 
one another, one despotic and one kingly, but rather two interchangeable languages to describe 
the same network of power, in which despotic power and kingly power both repel and attract 
each other. In this sense, the figure of the slave compels one to reformulate the relationship 
between the king and the despot, between the polis and the oikos. Through the slave, the 
despotic relation surfaces as the hidden kernel of all Greek politics, the primary referent of 
which is instrumentalized bare life. 
 
The Circle 
Let us, at this point, fast forward 2400 years to discuss The Circle. The novel opens with Mae’s 
arrival at the Circle’s massive, spectacular campus. The everyday life on campus is busy. Yet, 
the Circle is not only a business but also a “spiritual state, and dramatis personae, intended to 
represent America” (Attwood 2013). The three top executives of the Circle, called the “Three 
Wise Men,” are central in this respect. One is Ty, Tyler Alexander Gospodinov, the visionary 
behind TruYou. The other Wise Man is Eamon Bailey, the caring public face of the Circle 
“loved” by all employees (Eggers 2013: 24). Tom Stenton, the third, is the Circle’s “world-
striding CEO and self-described Capitalist Prime” with “flat, unreadable eyes” (23). Further, 
to Mae’s surprise, there are regular “plankton-inspection” times for the creative wannabes 
“hoping the big whale … will find them tasty enough to eat” (27). So the Circle, the “big 
whale” or the Leviathan, is populated by shark-like characters on the one hand and the 
“plankton” outsiders volunteering to be captured on the other. In between there are the “Gang 
of the Forty,” the most important executives of the company who are “privy to its most secret 
plans and data,” (14) and the thousands of co-workers, one of which is Mae. 
The Circle’s stated mission is familiar: “Communication. Understanding. Clarity” (47). One 
of its projects in this spirit is the production of small cameras called SeeChange, which can be 
placed everywhere. Bailey presents them with an emphasis on their democratising function. 
“Tyrants can no longer hide” (67). If transparency will lead to “peace of mind” (68), the Circle 
must become “all-seeing, all-knowing” (70). The Circle’s another, similar product is 
Childtrack, an apps that enables parents and authorities tracking children all the time through 
a chip in their ankle. Another apps can search everything one has ever posted on the net and 
collate and break down this information. “We don’t delete at the Circle” (204). But the Circle’s 
most important project is one that seeks to “improve” democracy by making it possible for 
politicians to “go transparent” by allowing them to upload all their conversations, meetings, 
and every part of their day to be broadcast on their Circle page. Within weeks, thousands of 
elected politicians “go clear.” As non-transparent politicians turn into pariahs, the Circle itself 
goes transparent. A thousand SeeChange cameras are installed on campus so that its campus 
life can be watched by outsiders. Significantly, however, due to potential “problems they might 
pose for the protection of intellectual property,” many sensitive spaces remain without access 
to the cameras (242). 
Mae quickly conforms to the habits, opinions and expectations of the Circle. The book renders 
visible the distance between the old and the new Mae through a contrast to her family and, 
especially, Mae’s ex-boyfriend, Mercer. “Lumpy” and with a “giant shapeless form” (126), 
Mercer is nothing to compare to the Circlers. More annoying still are his critical views on 
technology. He likens the Circle to “some cult taking over the world” (258). Mae’s desire to 
exorcise Mercer from her life leads her, after a fight with Mercer, to stealing a kayak to shake 
off the memory of Mercer. It is late at night and the beach is empty, so she thinks that her law-
breaking episode will go unnoticed. But when she goes to work the morning after, she 
discovers that, thanks to a SeeChange camera located on the beach, the Circle knows all about 
it. She finds herself in a one-to-one meeting with Bailey. She is afraid of losing her job. But 
Bailey has another agenda. “Finally, finally, we can be good. In a world where bad choices are 
no longer an option, we have no choice but to be good. Can you imagine?” (290). Mae is 
relieved. Bailey continues: “We will finally realize our potential” (292). 
Immediately after this meeting, Bailey arranges a presentation for the Circlers, where he 
announces that Mae is going fully transparent. From now on she will wear a video camera on 
her all the time, and all her life, in the tiniest detail (except in bed and in the bathroom), will 
be recorded in full and aired just in time. On the screen behind Mae it reads: Secrets are Lies. 
Sharing is Caring. Privacy is Theft. 
Transformed into a video camera, Mae becomes the Circle’s public face. She works to give 
the viewers a glimpse of the daily life at the Circle. She has millions of watchers and has no 
doubts that she is helping to create a more transparent, perfect democracy. There are, though, 
others who are sceptical. One of them is Kalden, a guy with whom Mae has an episodic affair 
in her early days in the Circle. Kalden is critical of the Circle, thinking that its monopoly of 
power is a step toward “tyranny,” and warns Mae of the “completion.” Mae does not listen. 
She does not know what completion is either. She finds it out, though, when Bailey explains 
in a seminar that the Circle’s work toward transparency can actually lead to “a fully 
accountable government” (383). Which requires that all citizens go transparent. “So why not 
require every voting-age citizen to have a Circle account?” (388). After all, there are many 
things that are mandatory in contemporary democracies. People pay taxes, contribute to social 
security schemes, serve in juries, and so on. If, similarly, a TruYou account can be made 
mandatory to pay taxes or to receive governmental services, “then we can take the temperature 
of everyone at any time” (391). This will also be “nearly cost-free” (392). 
In order to get closer to “completion,” the Circle launches a new system, SoulSearch, which 
enables searching crowds to find criminals. Mae presents it to the Circlers and her 14 million 
watchers. First she selects an arbitrary fugitive criminal and distributes her photo through the 
Circle’s media. This results in her arrest in 10 minutes. Somebody among the audience yells 
“Let’s do another!” (452). Stenton suggests that she tries a regular civilian this time. “Okay,” 
she says. “Our second target today is not a fugitive from justice, but you might say he’s a 
fugitive from, well, friendship” (452). Acknowledging the laughter, she goes on: “This is 
Mercer Medeiros. I haven’t seen him in a few months, and would love to see him again” (452). 
Mercer is located driving somewhere in less than 10 minutes. But he is not interested in 
“communication.” Mae talks to Mercer through the Circle’s drone: 
“Mercer!” she said, in mock-authoritative voice. “Mercer, stop the car and surrender. 
You’re surrounded.” Then she thought of something that made her smile again. “You’re 
surrounded …” she said, lowering her voice, and then, in a chirpy alto, “by friends!” As 
she’d known they would, a burst of laughter and cheers thundered through the 
auditorium. (459) 
The audience is cheering, comments piling up, some stating that this is “the greatest viewing 
experience of their lives.” But Mercer is not stopping the car. Mae sees in his face “something 
like serenity” just before he commits suicide by speeding his car toward a concrete barrier 
(460-461). 
In the end of the book, which follows up this spectacle of suicide, Mae realizes that Kalden is 
really Ty. Ty explains to her that he goes around with another name for he works to prevent 
the “fucking shark that eats the world” (480). Ty thinks that politics is still possible. He 
suggests to her that they try to slow down the monster. “Slow what down? The company you 
created?” Ty answers that he was after a “more civil,” “more elegant” web. He didn’t imagine 
mandatory circle membership, a world in which “all government and all life was channelled 
through one network” (480). His idea is perverted into “a totalitarian nightmare” with no 
possibility of opting out (480). He admits that he discovered this when it was too late. “And 
then it was just too fast, and there was enough money to make any dumb idea real” (481). 
Mae is not convinced. Ty appeals to Mae’s intuition, asking her to imagine a world in which 
the Circle has devoured all competitors, can control all information. “Under the guise of having 
every voice heard, you create mob rule, a filterless society where secrets are crimes” (483). 
Bailey genuinely believes that life will be better if information becomes common. But when 
such “infocommunism” is paired with “ruthless capitalistic ambition,” the utopia is 
“monetized” (484). “And that’s so bad?” Mae asks. Equal access to information and services 
means, to her, “equality;” besides, the Circle is the promise of a world with no crime, murder, 
rape or kidnapping. “But who wants to be watched all the time?” “I do. I want to be seen. I 
want proof I existed” (484). Then, still unconvinced, Mae asks: “So what exactly do you want 
from me?” (485). 
Ty hands Mae a political statement, which, under the heading of “The Rights of Humans in a 
Digital Age,” attacks the Circle for measuring and quantifying the value of every human action 
with “catastrophic” consequences, and asserts the “right to anonymity,” claiming that 
everybody should have “the right to disappear” (485). He is hoping that if Mae reads this to 
the Circle’s watchers, the information he leaks could convince anyone, “no matter how blind,” 
that it is necessary to “dismantle” the circle. “And then what?” “Then,” replies Ty, “you and I 
go somewhere.” He says they can “vanish,” they can “hike” or “bike” somewhere in Tibet or 
the Mongolian steppe, or “sail…” (485). 
Mae pictured all this. She pictured the Circle being taken apart, sold off amid scandal, 
thirteen thousand people out of jobs, the campus overtaken, broken up, turned into a 
college or mall or something worse. And finally she pictured life on a boat with this man, 
sailing the world, untethered, but when she tried to, she saw, instead, the couple on the 
barge she’d met months ago on the bay. Out there, alone, living under a tarp, drinking 
wine from paper cups, naming seals, reminiscing about island fires. (486) 
At that point, “so close to apocalypse,” Mae can see everything “clearly:” what if she trusted 
Ty and acted accordingly? What if there were somebody else in her place, somebody without 
her “integrity” (489)? Mae's willingly slavish devotion to the Circle’s worldview, which she 
calls “loyalty,” results in the loss of all hopes of avoiding the beginning of the end, the 
“completion” of the circle, and we end up in a dystopian world: 
a world where everyone could know each other truly and wholly, without secrets, without 
shame and without the need for permission to see or to know, without the selfish hoarding 
of life—any corner of it, any moment of it. All of that would be, so soon, replaced by a 
new and glorious openness, a world of perpetual light. Completion was imminent, and it 
would bring peace, and it would bring unity, and all that messiness of humanity until 
now, all those uncertainties that accompanied the world before the Circle, would be only 
a memory. (491) 
 
Despotism as anti-despotism 
The despotic imperative can catch one on the flight, at the moment when one thinks one has 
escaped it. To quote from The Usual Suspects, “the greatest trick the devil has ever pulled is 
to convince the world he did not exist.” Thus today we are confronted not only with 
compulsory but also voluntary despotisms, which signify not compulsion but, as is the case 
with The Circle, a new dream of community or belonging. As such, The Circle encapsulates 
the predicament of politics in the contemporary trans-political society: a world of reversals and 
emptying out, a simulacrum, in which McDonald’s can engage in anti-obesity campaigns, the 
war against terror claims to bring “democracy”, dictators accuse their adversaries of being 
Fascists, private companies can take public responsibility… In this world, despotism, too, must 
appear as its opposite. Thus The Circle’s world is one in which “tyrants can no longer hide”. 
Already in the 1980s Baudrillard was asking: “Why does the World Trade Center have two 
towers” (Baudrillard 1988: 43)? The twin towers of the WTC were perfect parallelepipeds 
whose smooth surfaces merely mirrored each other, confirming the irrelevance of distinction 
and opposition in the “end” of history. Cancelling out difference, upon which politics is based, 
the WTC was a symbol of transpolitics: an obscene system in which dialectical polarity no 
longer exists, a simulacrum, where acts disappear without consequences in indifferent signs 
and images (Baudrillard 1994: 16, 32). As a consequence, in transpolitics, we are not only 
deprived of the real – ours is not merely a “post-truth” age – but also of the fiction. Thus Mae, 
who stands for the spontaneous ideology of the Circle, can no longer imagine the possibility 
of seeing things differently. The “completed” Circle is the end of history, what is left of a 
society when you take away the possibility of critique. In it, happiness is consumerism, politics 
conformism. The most crucial aspect of the Circle is that it takes itself for granted as 
democracy, declaring itself to be a final form. This accord with what exists paradoxically 
restores the mythic-despotic power in the form of a new, “democratic” taboo. Thus what 
appears to be “freedom” to the Circlers is really voluntary servitude. Tellingly in this regard, 
Mercer, the novel’s miscreant, is the only person who can look beyond what exists. 
The political order envisaged in The Circle is to create obedient subjects. Since individuals are 
governed by passions as well as reason, the Circle must control and, when necessary, repress 
human passions through fear. Hence the necessity of the spectacle of fear, of “crime,” 
“murder,” “rape” or “kidnapping” and “tyranny.” Fear legitimizes the authority of the Circle, 
which has security as its raison d’etre. To be sure, “people” submit their information to the 
Circle voluntarily, but at the moment they have transferred the information, their freedom 
disappears. As such, without the “people,” the Circle’s societal condition is really emptied out 
of democratic politics. This, however, does not suggest that “people” can retreat into the 
private. While the polis is privatized, the oikos is politicized. While fear de-politicizes the 
society, subjecting it to an economic logic, the private sphere is politicized to the point that 
“privacy” becomes “theft.” 
However, just as the sovereign must stand outside of the law so as to master it, the Circle 
exempts itself from the imperative of transparency when it is convenient (“intellectual 
property”). The Circle’s power is grounded not only in founding the law, by re-defining 
citizenship with reference to “mandatory” Circle accounts, but also in suspending the law. The 
Circle becomes a sovereign because it can decide on an exception, suspend the law which it 
imposes on others. The “force” of the Circle, its despotic kernel, consists in this capacity to 
exempt itself from its own order. 
What is the difference between Hiero’s despotism and the Circle’s? While for the Ancients 
nature is a given, taken for granted context for action, for the moderns, starting with 
Machiavelli and Hobbes, it becomes something to be formed (Newell 2013: 435). Thus, like 
Machiavelli’s Prince or Hobbes’s Leviathan, the Circle no longer positions itself within a 
transcendent nature. On the contrary, it is bent on imposing its own (transcendent) will or 
reason on an immanent nature (“Finally, finally, we can be good”). Accordingly, despotism, 
too, turns into something that can be extinguished. The paradox, however, is that while reacting 
antagonistically to what it perceives to be “tyranny,” the Circle re-affirmatively outbids itself, 
appropriating despotism while rejecting it. Consequently, the attempt at democratization and 
despotism contaminate and overlap with each other. The Circle’s zeal for imperviousness leads 
to its loss of immunity. 
The Circle’s is a paradoxical despotism designed to save us from despotism. If it appears as an 
invisible, managerial mechanism, this is only because politics in the Circle is reduced to a 
means to serve an end: security and economic well-being. Whether this end is achieved 
democratically or despotically matters only secondarily. Ultimately, therefore, next to its 
condemnation of “tyranny,” the Circle can easily suspend democracy through forced 
participation in the spectacle, denying people the right not to participate in its network. And 
so, although condemned, despotism returns in an informational-technological variant and is 
assimilated into the Circle’s spectacle-democracy. 
What is remarkable, though, is the similarity between the Circle’s rule and Simonides’ 
reformed despotism designed for Hiero: in both Hiero and The Circle, the wise claim to know 
more about ruling than the rulers, making an attempt to teach the rulers how they can enroll 
the people into their rule, making their own desire theirs, and winning their willing obedience. 
But unlike Xenophon, who lets Simonides, a shrewd poet, advice the despot, thus keeping 
Socrates or philosophy at a distance from this role, the Circle’s neo-liberal wise men conflate 
the role of the philosopher, the economist and the ruler. The consequence is that Simonides’s 
concern with economy is let loose in a “democratic” context. What is new in the Circle is, in 
other words, capitalism as a system, as something that cannot be subordinated to the state. As 
Foucault has shown, liberal political economy traditionally sought to separate the political and 
economic spheres (Foucault 2008: 283). Neo-liberalism, in contrast, seeks to extend the powers 
of economy into political and social contexts. Neo-liberalism involves an “economisation,” the 
extension of the economic logic into domains which have hitherto been considered to be non-
economic (219; see also Brown 2015). In this sense the Circle’s is a fully economised social 
order inhabited by subjects who consider themselves as their own capital.  
The political consequence of economization is to stifle politics by turning societies into 
hostages to a pre-empted future, into “societies of control” (Deleuze 1995: 181). And 
importantly, this process involves morality, the creation of a “soul”: “We are taught businesses 
have souls, which is surely the most terrifying news in the world” (181). Hence one of the 
intriguing comments Mae receives after her spectacular success with turning herself into a 
camera: 
You connected it all. You found a way to save all the souls. This is what we were doing 
in the church—we tried to get them all. How to save them all? This has been the work 
of missionaries for millennia. […] There can be one morality, one set of rules. Imagine! 
(Eggers 2013: 395) 
For the same reason, Mercer likens the Circle to a “cult taking over the world” (258). The 
Circle’s is an ideology that desires to become a new religion, to create a perfect community, 
through a sacrificial logic (sacrificing privacy, freedom, democracy…). Therefore, also, it 
attracts many for “the offering to obscure gods of an object of sacrifice is something to which 
few subjects can resist succumbing, as if under some monstrous spell” (Lacan 1994: 275). 
However, while the Circle functions as an “obscure” religion, there is a fundamental difference 
between the Circle and religion. Religious belief involves uncertainty, “fear and trembling,” 
without which the believers would be reduced to puppets in a mechanical universe 
(Kierkegaard 1962: 7, 111). The ideology of the Circle, in contrast, is certain that it has direct 
access to the knowledge of the good and its paradigmatic subject, e.g. Mae, perceives herself 
as its willing instrument. In this sense, the key to understand the libidinal economy of the Circle 
is enjoyment, or more specifically, the Sadistic enjoyment derived from “doing one’s duty”, 
from the self-instrumentalization in relation to a superego figure (see Žižek 2001: 112). 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, what frightens Mae more than anything else is, as it transpires in the 
end of the book, is the free “use” of the world and herself, the image of a world in which she 
does not have to realize her potentials. Thus, when she pictures herself as contemplating the 
world, without being (ab)used by the Circle, she is repelled by this scene “so close to 
apocalypse.” This contrast between use/contemplation and abuse/instrumentalization, depicted 
vividly in the book, also encapsulates the contrast between freedom and despotism. (It is 
telling, along the same lines, that in the film version this final dialogue is removed; instead, in 
the film Mae turns the Circle’s weapon against itself and tricks Bailey and Stenton themselves 
into going transparent, which, curiously, justifies the ideology of transparency while, at the 
same time, turning the critique of the spectacle into a spectacle.) 
As a mode of measuring “opinion”, the Circle’s obsession with data, its assumption that data 
is value-free, is symptomatic for contemporary politics in which combinations of data function 
as a “grid” that frames, and thus delimits, political perceptions (Deleuze 2006: 144). There is 
in this sense a link between the Circle-style algorithmic governmentality and repression. The 
constant measuring of opinion is a highly depoliticized practice that tends to reduce politics to 
affects. Consequently, as the old political distinctions (such as the one between the Left and 
the Right) disappears into a dialectic of affects, primarily of fears, the logic of the democracy 
starts to resemble that of the single party system (Badiou 2008: 28). Consensus turns into an 
invariant of politics, and most significant issues cease to create scissions, taking “democracy” 
and the market merely as an unquestionable, naturalized background. Indeed, in this sense 
“Stalinism” might be “the future of parliamentary democracy” (29). 
At this point we also arrive at the central tension the book stages. In the Circle, information is 
said to be socialized but it becomes the property of the Circle. All information, captured by the 
Circle, thus functions as an instrument of domination, or, as a dispositive. This is why it is 
“blasphemous” (Eggers 2013: 410) not to allow one’s information to be “shared.” In this sense, 
the socialization the Circle initiates has a meaning only in relation to individual-private 
property. What is unimaginable to the Circle is information as something common to all. In 
this respect, it might be illuminating to consider the Circle in terms of network. It is often 
argued that in the “new spirit of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007) the activity of the 
mediator in establishing and extending networks is becoming “a value in itself”, irrespective 
of the specific goal or substantial character of the mediated entities (107). “In a connectionist 
world, a natural preoccupation of human beings is the desire to connect with others, to make 
contact, so as not to remain isolated” (111). But is a networked world another Circle? To be 
sure, connectionism can always be used in the networks in an opportunistic way. This 
opportunism, however, is not justified in the new spirit of capitalism: one should be acting in 
search of the “common good”, that is, in order to engage with others, inspire confidence, be 
tolerant, respect differences and pass information to others, so that everyone in a network can 
increase their “employability” (115). In this sense the new capitalism has an ethical scheme of 
evaluation. In networks everything “belongs” to everything else, “everything may be allied to 
everything else”, but “nothing can be reduced to anything else, nothing can be deduced from 
anything else” (Latour 1988: 163). That is, networking is, ideally, an “irreductionist” affair 
which cannot be thought of in functionalistic, systemic terms. As such it is antithetical to the 
logic of the Circle. 
There is, however, a potential link. Networks can always be abused, a networker can always 
reduce others in a network to a commodity. Insofar as the pursuit of profit remains the 
fundamental horizon of networks, that is, insofar as the distinction between “disinterested” 
sharing in the interest of the “common good” and the strategic-instrumentalist utilization of 
network relations is blurred, the intermediaries start to behave as if they have “a property right 
over the person of the one whom he puts in contact with a third party, who anticipates an 
advantage from this liaison” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 456). As if, in other words, 
“privacy is theft.” And such networking coincides with exploitation in its strongest, biopolitical 
sense, which involves the instrumentalization of human beings (see 364, 365). Herein lies the 
ultimate similarity between Hiero’s world and the Circle. The risk of networking is falling back 
upon biopolitics, and since this risk is an inbuilt, structural risk, the world of networks is always 
prone to become a despotic world. 
Thus in the Circle we confront two inter-linked processes. On the one hand, we have economy, 
which demands the re-modeling of the whole society according to the principles of marketing. 
And on the other hand we have subjects expected to continuously re-format their souls and to 
glorify the cult religiously. Religion, Feuerbach had said, takes over the best qualities of 
humans and allocates them to God, affirming in God what is negated in man (1989: 27). Hence 
the paradox of religious alienation: the more God is glorified, the more human life is 
depreciated and devalued. And so, the bigger the Circle gets, the smaller the “people” become. 
Just as religion captures what is profane and sacralizes it, The Circle captures the commons 
and commodifies them for display in the spectacle. It is significant, therefore, that Debord 
describes the spectacle as “the material construction of the religious illusion” (1983: 20). In 
the Circle, to exist is to be seen. The spectacle is a promise of immortality. But while for 
Debord capitalism is the engine of the spectacle, with Agamben (2011) one can claim that the 
originary link is not only between capitalism and the spectacle but rather, and more generally, 
between theology and economy. A theological genealogy shows that the Greek term 
oikonomia, which signifies the despotic management of the household, attained a special 
function in the Trinitarian Christianity: God, even though he is One, also designates a celestial 
design, the “divine plan of salvation” (Agamben 2011: 20). As such, oikonomia is the concept 
that links together the absent God and his earthly overseer. This means that the economy (the 
praxis which is to be followed to reach the goal of salvation) has no foundation in ontology (in 
creation). However, praxis (the Son) must be related to ontology (God); God and his 
government of the world must be brought together. Hence the significance of the concept of 
“free will,” which, Nietzsche insisted, was “fabricated” to make humanity “accountable” to a 
transcendent God (1969: 53). Through this concept, Christianity has sought to reconcile a 
transcendent God which is inoperative in relation to the existing world, and a savior/redeemer 
as the ruler of the world. In this sense, Christian theology is not only political but also 
economic-managerial from the start (Agamben 2011: 66). 
Along the same lines, the fabrication of consent or the spectacle is the point at which political 
and economic theology, politics and economy, intersect. Predictably, therefore, the 
glorification of the Circle parallels the glorification of God. Just as religion demands the 
infinite increase (subjective glorification of God) of what cannot be increased (objective glory 
of God), the Circle demands infinite accumulation (ratings, subjective glorification of the 
Circle) of what is beyond human agency (objective glory of the Circle as a spectacle). 
Paradoxically, in both cases, “glorification is ... what produces glory” (Agamben 2011: 216, 
227). In both cases the paradox is a cover for the fact that the centre of the machine is empty, 
that what is at stake is human life, which is inoperative, contemplating, that is, without a 
utilitarian purpose (245-6). 
 Instead of Conclusion: Neo-despotism? 
Despotism is said in many ways; it has many faces. So is the use of it. The classical literature, 
as is exemplified by Hiero here, understands despotism through its triangulation with economy 
and consent. In a counter-classical approach, which is forced by the reading of The Circle, the 
focus seems to shift to another, emerging triangulation: neo-despotism, use and dissent. The 
two triangulations are not identical, but they are allied. Precisely because they do not overlap 
completely, they produce differences. Thus, the reading of The Circle casts the classical 
tradition in a new light, allowing us to revitalize it by putting it into a different use. 
In both Hiero and The Circle, though, there are common themes. In both, it is fear, the fear of 
dissent, that gives rise to the security imperative. My contention is that the imperative of 
security is what needs to be thought as neo-despotism today. Today, as before, the security 
imperative of the despot is synonymous with the security of the despot. In both Hiero and The 
Circle, therefore, one can hear the echo of Louis the XIV’s iconic maxims: “I am the state” 
and “Without me, civil war.” Security has to secure itself against potential immanent threats 
before securing anything. Civil war, or dissent in broader terms, is the foundation of security. 
Leviathan, or Behemoth: this is the blackmail of the despot who promises to save us from other 
despots. 
In both Hiero and The Circle, people are willing to submit to the will of the despot, accepting 
both of the despotic maxims, while freedom turns into a burden. In this sense, there is a 
contradiction between freedom, which is tied to use, and voluntary servitude, which promises 
a freedom born of the fear of dissent. Nevertheless, what is new in The Circle is that voluntary 
servitude defines itself as freedom, just as the neo-despotism of the Circle misrecognizes itself, 
sees itself as the reincarnation of the will of the people, all the while what it is is despotism. 
Hiero knew that he was a despot. Thus in Hiero there is no shame attached to being a despot; 
what interests Xenophon is Hiero’s paradoxes. The Circle, in contrast, misrecognizes itself as 
a democratic structure, while “tyranny” is externalized and projected onto other times and 
spaces. But misrecognition itself is a perversion. Seeing oneself as the incarnation of the people 
is where the abuse of power, a function of misrecognition, begins. 
Along the same lines, today consent emerges as an apparatus of abuse. Just as the ancient slave-
instrument incarnated the abuse of use, the manufacturing of free will, the mechanism of 
voluntary servitude, is animated here by technology. Automata, after all, is what happens when 
you achieve voluntary servitude. Voluntary servitude, in this sense, is a function of the system 
of counting, of a despotic account, regardless of whether it is implemented by an individual 
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